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How does a court’s policy-making authority shape the nature of judicial behav-
ior? We argue that judicial systems that limit policy-making authority also dis-
courage the politicization of courts, encouraging judges to think narrowly about
the interests of litigating parties. In contrast, granting a court high policy-making
authority—affecting potentially thousands of cases and other branches of gov-
ernment—naturally encourages judges to consider broader ideological prin-
ciples. Typically, unraveling cause and effect would be difﬁcult, as judicial
behavior and institutions are usually stable and endogenous. But an especially
stark sequence of political and institutional changes in Brazil affords analytic
leverage to explore these questions. A series of judicial reforms greatly ex-
panded the Brazilian Supreme Court’s authority, and our analysis of judicial
decisions shows the emergence of a political cleavage on the court after
these reforms. (JEL C140, K39, K49)
1. Introduction
The policy-making authority of constitutional courts worldwide has ex-
panded dramatically since the 1980s (e.g., Tate and Vallinder 1997;
Ginsburg 2003; Hirschl 2004). Courts with weak policy-making
authority—deﬁned here as consisting of (1) the lack of docket control,
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(2) narrow, inter partes effects, and (3) non-binding effects1—are more
likely to ﬁnd themselves overloaded with repetitive cases. Reforms in
these settings that expand policy-making authority aim to solve a set of
problems associated with overcrowded dockets, including long delays,
inefﬁciency, limited access due to the aforementioned delays and inefﬁ-
ciency, and low or decreasing public conﬁdence in the judiciary’s ability to
solve conﬂicts due to all of the preceding concerns. In short, enhancing the
policy-making authority of judges can have many salutary operational
beneﬁts for high courts.
Yet, reforms intended to solve one set of problems can have unintended
consequences. Increasing the policy-making authority of judges on peak
courts—that is, establishing docket control, as well as general (erga
omnes), binding effects—generates new incentives for judges to think
beyond the particular interests of the parties to the case, even to craft
broad solutions to recurring or trenchant conﬂicts. These new incentives
can alter the strategy of judicial decision making and judicial selection,
intensifying the salience of policy programs with ideological orientations,
and setting in motion new inter-branch relations. Indeed, if the increase in
policy-making authority is paired with changes in the partisan compos-
ition of constitutional courts, an institutional reform designed to simply
reduce the size of crowded dockets has the potential to trigger dramatic
changes in the partisan nature of judicial politics.
In this paper we explore the impact of policy-making authority on ju-
dicial behavior. We focus on the case of Brazil, a civil law system in which
judging has historically been regarded as legalistic and largely apolitical,
and where judges have historically had low policy-making authority.
The high court’s power in this regard was greatly expanded in a series of
reforms in the early 2000s. We test for an impact of these reforms by
collecting and examining an original data set of all decisions on a major
class of constitutional review cases (Direct Constitutional Actions, or
ADIs) considered by the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF)
from 1989–2010. Using both spatial and nonparametric methods, we
ﬁnd evidence of an emerging partisan cleavage. We argue that this evolu-
tion is a function of both (a) an ideological re-alignment on the court after
the 2002 general election, and (b) reforms granting increasing formal ju-
dicial authority which were intended to focus the court’s attention on
larger constitutional questions. Crucially, changes in court composition
alone do not trigger the partisan cleavage. Rather, the cleavage appears
1. A more complete conceptual deﬁnition of policy-making authority might include jur-
isdiction. We conceptualize policy-making authority without reference to jurisdiction pri-
marily because the 2004 reforms did not alter the court’s jurisdictional boundaries. One could
argue that the new requirements for a showing of “general repercussions” in RE cases reduced
the ability of this type of case to reach the court, affecting the court’s jurisdiction, but we
address this as docket control. In short, we do not discuss variation in jurisdiction in the
remainder of the paper because there is none to discuss, and any discussion of jurisdiction
would be redundant with our discussion of docket control.
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only after a substantial increase in the policy-making authority of the
court. Thus, the institutional reform was a necessary condition for the
behavioral change to take place. Our ﬁndings shed light on the institu-
tional sources of behavioral transformations on peak courts within civil
law systems and the unintended consequences of institutional reform,
contributing to a growing literature on comparative judicial politics.
We proceed in four steps. We ﬁrst outline a theory about how the
institutional expansion of judges’ policy-making authority can alter the
decision-making calculus of judges, and identify the empirical implica-
tions that ﬂow from such an argument. We then introduce the Brazilian
constitutional court, which has been widely characterized as apolitical and
pragmatically professional. We describe the institutional changes affecting
the policy-making authority of judges on this court and changes in the
partisan composition of the court. In this section, we also discuss the
particular type of constitutional cases we examine. Third, we present
our quantitative and qualitative evidence, which reveals an emerging
cleavage on the court, and we discuss the key factors driving that
change. Finally, we discuss the broader implications for studies of com-
parative judicial politics, highlighting the main lesson from Brazil, namely,
that shifts in the composition of the court paired with institutional reforms
that raise the political signiﬁcance of decision making can activate political
cleavages in judicial behavior where they were previously latent.
2. Institutional Reforms and the Activation of Partisan Cleavages
Why should institutional reforms that enhance the policy-making author-
ity of judges activate previously latent partisan or ideological cleavages? A
closer examination of the contrasting sets of incentives faced by judges on
peak courts under conditions of (a) weak policy-making authority and (b)
strong policy-making authority clariﬁes the argument. Reforms that move
high courts from (a) to (b) facilitate the expression of otherwise latent
partisan cleavages.
First, when policy-making authority is weak, courts have little or no
docket control and judges’ rulings have narrow, inter partes effects and are
nonbinding. The absence of docket control means that judges must hear a
wide range of cases, many of which can be repetitive or, if unique, quite
trivial, taking up valuable time and resources. Further, after adjudicating
these repetitive or trivial cases, the ﬁnal decision applies only to the parties
involved, sometimes as few as two parties, and may only have narrow
authoritative or persuasive weight for similarly situated actors in the
future. This weak authority has direct and indirect behavioral conse-
quences for high-court judges. Directly, judges have little incentive to
look beyond the speciﬁc interests of the particular parties to a case in
order to examine the broader pattern of social conditions or interactions
relevant to the conﬂict. There is little motivation to invest time, energy, or
reputation to stake out a stark, programmatic position on an issue that
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has narrow impact. All else being equal, we should expect judges to think
in more narrow, short-term ways, and we should have little expectation
that judges will develop a consistent, ideologically-informed, long-term,
programmatic jurisprudence when decisions have a particularistic impact.
Put brieﬂy, there is little incentive to develop a jurisprudence for as few as
two parties.
Indirectly, the weakness of judges’ policy-making authority reduces the
likelihood of ﬁling the kinds of cases that might call for a broader pro-
grammatic jurisprudence, thereby also acting as a brake on the develop-
ment of ideological proﬁles for judges. This is because plaintiffs face
strong incentives not to litigate issues that affect a large group or class
of people since the outcome of any one individual case does not have
general effects across similarly situated individuals. For instance, if
there is a large social class of people who have been discriminated against,
e.g., by race or sex, there is less incentive, ceteris paribus, to develop liti-
gation addressing patterns of social exclusion, inequities, or differential
treatment if each plaintiff will have to litigate their own case individually.
Thus, judges face direct disincentives to develop a jurisprudence based on
program, and indirectly there is less likelihood that judges will see the
kinds of cases that call out for solutions based on program. To be sure,
some extraordinary cases may surprise by not ﬁtting these expectations,
but the incentives should structure this general pattern. Directly and in-
directly, weak policy-making authority decreases the likelihood of seeing
partisan or ideological cleavages on the court.
In contrast, strong policy-making authority means judges exert docket
control and their decisions apply to all (general, or erga omnes effects) and
are binding. Docket control allows the court to prioritize matters, chan-
neling time and resources to the more signiﬁcant conﬂicts. Returning to
the direct/indirect distinction, general and binding effects directly encour-
age judges on peak courts to consider the interests of the parties to a case,
but to also look beyond those particular interests and survey the broader
social implications of the decision. Quite unlike the incentives for particu-
laristic decisions that are tailored to the parties under conditions of weak
policy-making authority, a strong version of this authority encourages
judges to think programmatically about solutions to the conﬂicts brought
before them. Moreover, judges recognize that a decision made in one type
of case today can be harnessed or leveraged in another type of case the
next day, and can begin to think much more strategically and with longer
time horizons about the interests included or excluded in their developing
jurisprudence. Indirectly, plaintiffs are also more likely to initiate the
kinds of cases that raise collective- or group-based issues, so judges are
more likely to be called upon to think broadly about these issues.
A few important caveats and clariﬁcations are required here. First, we
are not arguing that institutional change directly makes judges more ideo-
logical—just that reforms that enhance policy-making authority can affect
the role that ideology plays in decision-making. Existing theories of
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judicial decision-making posit that judges are motivated by partisanship
or ideology (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002; Sunstein et al. 2004, 2006), and
behave strategically vis-a`-vis each other and external actors in the pursuit
of their policy preferences (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998; Helmke 2005;
Staton 2010). Indeed, by expecting enhanced policy-making authority to
provide the conditions for the expression of partisan cleavages, we antici-
pate that the ideological motivations are there in the ﬁrst place. We only
argue that judges’ ideological beliefs remain latent under conditions of low
policy-making authority and become patent under conditions of increased
authority. In addition, a key assumption is that there is a diversity of
opinions on the court; increasingly ideological behavior will only generate
cleavages on a court when judges have ideological disagreements. This
diversity on the court is most often a function of appointments.
Stated differently, judicial attitudes are always there, but there is more
ideological diversity on a court that has experienced macro-political
changes (e.g., electoral turnover in the executive branch) that translate
into judicial appointments by a wider range of politicians. However,
this is where the attitudinal literature stops, assuming that ideological
differences express themselves once on the court. The strategic literature
takes up the idea that judicial behavior is interdependent, with individual
preferences constrained by the preferences of other actors, the internal
rules of the court, and the external strategic environment, including sep-
aration of powers and public opinion (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998).
Comparatively, there is increasing attention to how these dynamics play
out in authoritarian regimes, new democracies, and across different coun-
tries (e.g., Ginsburg 2003; Helmke 2005; Staton 2010; Kapiszewski 2012).
Recent work has also focused on the political consequences of different
legal traditions (e.g., Powell and Staton 2009; Garoupa et al. 2013; Powell
2013). However, there is little comparative work on the attitudinal model
(cf. Amaral Garcia et al. 2009; Garoupa et al. 2013), and even less atten-
tion outside the United States to the way judicial behavior changes lon-
gitudinally as institutional reforms alter the policy-making authority of
courts. We are unaware of comparative research that demonstrates how
institutional reforms alter the salience of partisan differences on a nation’s
peak court. Put more starkly, while the attitudinal model assumes ideolo-
gical differences are expressed, and the strategic model emphasizes factors
that constrain the expression of ideology, we identify institutional changes
that—whether intended or unintended—have the effect of encouraging
the expression of partisan differences.2
Empirically testing our argument is generally difﬁcult because in many
systems courts evolve gradually, and there are expectations of endogeneity
between judicial behavior and judicial institutions. An ideal context for
testing (provided by Brazil) would be one of dramatic and sequential
changes in court composition and then in policy-making authority.
2. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
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In this context, our theory predicts that cleavages on the court will not
immediately appear after compositional changes—because the institutions
do not motivate broader thinking in judicial decision making. Instead,
cleavages will appear or deepen only after an increase in policy-making
authority. If the cleavages appear before the increase in authority, that
would be more in line with a standard attitudinal argument, and strong
evidence against our argument about the behavioral consequences of
institutional reform. In sum, especially strong evidence in favor of our
argument would consist of the following sequence: a marked shift in the
partisan composition of the court accompanied by no partisan cleavage,
followed by an increase in authority and then the appearance of a partisan
cleavage.
3. Case Selection: Brazil’s STF and ADIs
We focus herein on the Brazilian STF for several reasons. Brazil is an
emerging power, its judiciary is understudied, and it deserves attention in
its own right. More importantly, Brazil’s high court is a crucial case for the
study of the behavioral consequences of institutional reforms on peak
courts. Brazil’s STF has previously been regarded as epitomizing much
of what is traditionally understood about judging on high courts in civil
law systems: empirical studies consistently ﬁnd that judges are persistently
formalist, legalist, and apolitical. A common ﬁnding is that the recruit-
ment and selection process prevents an overly partisan court (Nunes
2010), and the ethos of professionalism trumps ideology (Brinks 2005;
Taylor 2008; Kapiszewski 2010; 2011b). Put otherwise, behavior on the
STF has largely been understood as illustrative of the paradigm of judging
in civil law systems.
However, over the past 15 years, a series of institutional reforms have
progressively increased the policy-making authority of the court, begin-
ning mainly in 1999, but most emphatically in 2004. Alongside these in-
stitutional reforms, the presidency has been occupied by politicians
representing a steady progression from right to left along the ideological
spectrum, beginning with the former supporter of the military regime, Jose´
Sarney (1985–89), through two administrations of the centrist Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), to the two administrations of the center-
left Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva (2003–10). Each administration appointed
judges to the court, so the partisan composition of the court varies over
time in ways that enhance analytic leverage. Thus, on both our key vari-
ables of interest, there is rich variation in Brazil.
Moreover, the progressive expansion of judges’ policy-making author-
ity on this peak court has been preceded by changes in the partisan com-
position of the court. This combination of political-then-institutional
change is ideal for testing the behavioral consequences of institutional
reform, as outlined in the empirical implications of our argument above.
If a partisan cleavage emerges after a change in court composition but
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before the expansion of authority, the phenomenon is more likely attitu-
dinal. If, however, there is a change in court composition but the partisan
cleavage only appears after a subsequent expansion of authority, then our
institutional argument is supported. In sum, the combination of variation
in institutional reform and court composition, as well as the sequence of
political and institutional changes, generate a kind of natural experiment
for our research question. In the context of changing partisan composition
of the High Court, reforms occur that are intended to bring about admin-
istrative improvements. We are interested in whether the expansion of
judicial authority had the unintended consequence of activating partisan
cleavages on the court.
In this paper, we test the impact of partisan and institutional changes on
judicial behavior in Brazil with an original dataset of every case of Direct
Constitutional Action (Ac¸a˜o Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, ADI)
decided by the STF from the new, 1988 Constitution until the end of
the second Lula administration in 2010. We test for emerging political
cleavages on the court as evidence of an emerging attitudinal or ideolo-
gical division among justices. ADIs constitute the central mechanism of
abstract constitutional review in Brazil, and they capture some of the most
high-proﬁle constitutional clashes (see Data and Results).3
Some observers might argue that ADIs are the wrong type of decision
for this analysis for alternate reasons: (a) ADIs constitute a small portion
of the STF’s workload, (b) ADIs are the cases where partisan cleavages are
most likely to appear, or (c) ADIs can be viewed as being less about
subjective individual rights and more about objective constitutionality.
First, ADIs do indeed constitute a small portion of the STF’s work, but
they are also some of the most important cases that come before the court.
Kapiszewski (2011a) identiﬁes the 55 most politically important cases that
reached the STF between 1985 and 2004, and the majority of those cases
were ADIs (30, or 55%). Second, because of their importance, ADIs may
draw out partisan cleavages, but there is little evidence that suggests, ex
ante, that partisan differences should be most likely to manifest them-
selves in ADI litigation. Indeed, given that ADIs are a mechanism of
abstract review, some scholars may argue that partisan cleavages are
less likely here than in cases of concrete review, since more immediate
3. The sample includes all ADIs, as noted, and excludes all other types of cases, including
ADOs (Ac¸a˜o Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por Omissa˜o) and ADPFs (Arguic¸a˜o de
Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental). In doing so, we follow other authors who
have focused on a single class of cases (e.g., Taylor 2008), and also reason that doing so
allows us to control for procedural differences across types of cases. Further, the volume of
ADIs far exceeds the volume of ADOs or ADPFs. For instance, in 1995 there were more than
100 decisions rendered in ADI cases but none in either ADO or ADPF cases; in 2005 there
were more than 250 decisions rendered regarding ADIs, none for ADOs and only 20 for
ADPFs; and in 2010, there were again more than 250 ADI decisions, only 3 for ADOs, and 23
for ADPFs (http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico¼estatistica; accessed
January 6, 2014).
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interests are at stake in, as Article III of the US Constitution states, actual
cases or controversies. Lastly, as raised by the third potential critique
related to a focus on ADIs, but which is also related to the likelihood of
observing partisan cleavages in ADIs, this type of case may be an unlikely
place to observe partisan cleavages because ADIs are viewed by some as
being less about subjective rights and more about objective constitution-
ality. That is, ADI litigation is less about righting a wrong suffered by an
individual or group of citizens and more about establishing the centrality
or supremacy of the constitution. Evidence of this is in passage (a) and (b)
of Law 9.868, which does not allow plaintiffs to desist from an ADI once
initiated. That is, once the constitutional question is raised, it must be
answered, even if the original plaintiff desists.4
However, it is also undeniable that, like much constitutional litigation
that raises formal, procedural, and technical–legal issues, there are real
rights at stake. Even if rights-related litigation via ADIs is a relatively
recent phenomenon (Brinks 2011: 142; Kapiszewski 2011a: 160), the use
of this mechanism for rights-related cases undercuts the argument that
these cases are only used to maintain objective constitutional order. A few
examples demonstrate the kinds of very high-proﬁle rights that hinge on
the outcome of these cases: (1) ADI 3.197 and 3.333, which dealt with
racial quotas and afﬁrmative action in Brazilian universities, (2) ADI
3.239, raising the constitutionality of land invasions by Afro-Brazilian
descendants of the settlers and inhabitants of quilombos, independent
communities of freed or escaped slaves during the colonial period, (3)
ADI 3.510, which pitted the ability to conduct scientiﬁc research on
stem cells against an argument combining elements of right-to-life and
human dignity, (4) ADI 4.077, which tackled freedom of information
and the transparency of government records, and (5) ADI 4.277, decided
in 2012, in which the STF extended the concept of family to same-sex
couples.
Still, the presumably “objective” character of ADIs merits further em-
phasis, along with the concentrated and abstract nature of ADI review, as
attention to these features of review helps understand why the expansion
of policy-making authority may be especially felt by ADIs, particularly
after 2004. We turn now to a discussion of these features of constitutional
review in Brazil, the expansion of policy-making authority, and changes in
court composition.
4. The Brazilian Court and Implications of Recent Changes
In this section we provide an overview of the Brazilian judicial system
and the literature on decision making on the Brazilian high court,
4. Though the STF need not reach a ﬁnal decision on themerits for a variety of procedural
reasons. For instance, if the challenged law or other state action is revoked, replaced, or
otherwise nulliﬁed, the issue is moot and the legal action loses its object (perda de objeto), e.g.,
ADI 3.197.
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the Supremo Tribunal Federal. We then discuss a series of powerful
reforms that enhanced judicial authority, as well as political factors
that diversiﬁed the court’s partisan composition. We apply our
theoretical framework and conclude this section with a series of
hypotheses. We ﬁrst discuss the court prior to major reforms, focusing
on the limited policy-making authority of judges, then show how major
reforms, especially in 2004, greatly increased the court’s inﬂuence. Put
simply, we can speak of a dramatic expansion in the STF’s powers as of
2004.
A brief overview of the Brazilian judiciary clariﬁes the signiﬁcance of
the 2004 reform. The Brazilian judicial system is organized into distinct
hierarchies of courts that deal with speciﬁc types of legal issues. There are
subnational judicial institutions within each of the 27 states, but at the
federal level the judiciary is generally understood as structured into four
legal arenas: civil and criminal courts, military, labor, and electoral courts.
Within the ﬁrst set of institutions, the Supremo Tribunal Federal, or STF,
is the apex constitutional court, adjudicating all major national constitu-
tional disputes about the proper separation of powers—horizontal (be-
tween branches of government) and vertical (between lower and higher
units of the federation), as well as serving as the court of ﬁnal appeal for all
other cases. The STF is relatively accessible, comparable to the constitu-
tional courts of Colombia and Costa Rica as one of the most accessible
constitutional fora in Latin America (Taylor 2008: 78). The STF receives
thousands of cases every year, and has adjudicated diverse cases
(Taylor:3), ranging from economic stabilization programs, privatization
policies, afﬁrmative action, and the amnesty law of 1979 that barred pros-
ecution of those guilty of torture and other abuses during the military
regime.
Despite the court’s accessibility and broad range of cases it has heard,
judging on this court—the actual-decision making process of the 11 just-
ices—has been widely regarded as typical of civil law systems. Speciﬁcally,
while the STF was designed to be a strong court, it exhibited some of the
features of civil law judiciaries that limited the legal effects of judicial
decisions, rendering the court a weak policy-making institution. Thus,
in assessing the overall policy-making authority of the court along
Ginsburg’s (2003) ﬁve axes—accessibility, accountability, tenure, size,
and effects—the court would have received high marks on the ﬁrst four
axes, but low marks on the last axis covering the effects of decisions. More
to the point, the STFs decisions could not be binding on all public autho-
rities, and the court did not systematically consider the general effects of
its decisions. As we will explain below, a key reform in 2004 changed both
of these limitations on the effects of the STFs decisions, greatly augment-
ing its policy-making authority.
This expansion of policy-making authority came with the passage of a
national judicial reform in 2004, Constitutional Amendment 45 (EC45),
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which took effect on January 1, 2005.5 This reform made several changes
in the judiciary, but two of the most important were (1) granting the STF
the legal concept of precedent, captured in the “su´mula vinculante” (SV,
literally “binding thesis” or “binding summary”) mechanism, and (2)
requiring that actions for Extraordinary Review (recurso extraordina´rio,
RE) make a showing of “general effects” or “general repercussions”
(repercussa˜o geral). The reform took effect on January 1, 2005, and sub-
sequently a pair of laws in December 2006 (Law 11.417/06 and Law
11.418/06) further regulated SVs and REs. A closer look at each of
these components of the 2004 reform demonstrates why we consider this
reform to be a signiﬁcant expansion of authority.
Regarding SVs, this is an action that can be initiated by any of the
actors with standing to initiate an ADI. To do so successfully, the peti-
tioning party must show that there are multiple constitutional cases on the
issue, and that there is disagreement among the courts or the executive
about how to interpret the constitution. Lastly, in order to become an SV,
a two-thirds majority of the STF is required (Const. art 103-A; EC45). If
successfully issued, the SV ruling supercedes all the consolidated rulings
related to the issue, and has general and binding effects on all courts and
5. Some observers familiar with Brazilian constitutional lawmight wonder why we do not
examine a 1999 law that reformed the ADI procedure. While access to the ADI mechanism
was broadened by expanding standing in the 1988 Constitution, it was not until Law 9.868/99,
which became effective on November 10, 1999, that the process of initiating, processing, and
deciding ADIs was fully regulated. Among other things, Law 9.868 addressed the legal effect
of ADI decisions, establishing that this effect would apply to all (erga omnes effects), and
would also be binding (“vinculante”) on the judiciary and all public administration, i.e., the
executive. Law 9.868 also regulated Declaratory Actions of Constitutionality (ADCs), which
were created by a 1993 law. However, the STF hears very fewADCs and in any case it was not
until the 1999 law that the effect of ADCs and ADIs was made clear, so we focus on 1999 as
the ﬁrst clear, post-1988 expansion of policy-making authority (cf. Nunes 2010). Notably, the
binding effect of ADIs did not extend to the legislature, and is also generally not regarded as
extending to the STF itself, since it can change jurisprudence over time (Camargo 2006).
Given this institutional expansion of policy-making authority, especially given its focus on
ADIs, some readers may argue we should anticipate that partisan cleavages would be dis-
cernible from 2000 forward compared with the prior period from 1989–99. We acknowledge
that the 1999 law at least nominally enhanced the policy-making authority of the STF, but
that we should not expect a partisan cleavage for several reasons. First, President Cardoso
only appointed three judges to the STF, and all of these came late in his administration,
mostly in the second half of his second term (compared with eight by Lula, with four in the
ﬁrst half of his ﬁrst term!). Thus, the composition of the court did not changemuch in order to
generate the basic political diversity that would underpin a partisan cleavage. Second, the
increase in policy-making authority from the 1999 law was negligible compared with the
factors increasing this authority in 2004. For an ADI ruling to be binding in a later case,
the facts and legal question raised in the latter case had to be virtually identical (Rcl 9662,
stating that legal question must be “similar on all points, if not identical”; authors’ transla-
tion). This is not the case with the 2004 reform, which encourages STF judges to think very
broadly and systematically about their jurisprudential positions and how these positions
might be consolidated across a wide range of cases (see discussion below). In any case, we
ran a set of auxiliary spatial and nonparametric auxiliary analyses to test for the emergence of
a partisan cleavage after 1999 (but before 2002), and did not ﬁnd one.
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public administration at all levels of government. While the formal effect
of an SV ruling is essentially the same as that established for ADIs in 1999,
the way an SV can take shape is very different. First, while there have been
several thousand ADIs since 1989, there are over a million cases decided
by the STF, and many thousands more at the various other levels of the
judiciary. In theory, at least, a petitioning party in an SV is able to scan all
of these cases for an issue that has been raised repeatedly and for which
there appears to be no constitutional consensus. The purpose of the SV,
then, is to generate a more homogeneous or uniform jurisprudence for the
entire country, across all types of constitutional litigation. The reform will
certainly have the effect of reducing caseloads, but we anticipate that this
also generated a major incentive for STF judges to think more program-
matically about their jurisprudential positions across all cases, including
ADIs, as judges may now be forced to reconcile decisions across multiple
cases in future litigation. Indeed, the second SV that reached the STF
(SV2, issued August 10, 2007) relied on six previous ADI decisions as
“precedents” that the SV sought to consolidate into a summary jurispru-
dential statement.
At the same time, in order to be heard by the STF after January 1, 2005,
all RE cases—which constitute the single largest class of cases at the STF
and number in the hundreds of thousands (!)—must demonstrate that the
issue they raise has “general repercussions” (Const. art 102, sec. 3; EC45).
At a minimum, this part of the reform endows the STF with at least some
degree of docket control. Beyond that, however, the criteria for “general
repercussions” require that claimants frame their case of subjective con-
stitutional review in the language of objective constitutional review, again
incentivizing STF judges to think beyond the interests of the speciﬁc par-
ties to the case. In 2006, Law 11.418/06, reforming the Code of Civil
Procedure, went further by specifying more precise criteria for ﬁnding
“general repercussions”. Speciﬁcally, general repercussions exist (and
the case can therefore be heard), if the case raises issues of economic,
social, political, or juridical relevance that “go beyond the subjective inter-
ests of the action”6 (Law 11.418/06, art. 2; CPC art. 543-A(1)). More
importantly, general repercussions are presumed to exist if the RE is chal-
lenging a lower decision that cuts against a su´mula or jurisprudeˆncia of the
STF (CPC art. 543-A(3)). As used in Brazil, a “jurisprudeˆncia” is a de-
veloping line of similarly motivated decisions, while a “su´mula” goes one
step further, offering a summary of the cases that compose the jurispru-
deˆncia. Neither is formally binding or has formal general effects, but both
have authoritative weight. However, since the court has gone to the added
trouble of formally consolidating its jurisprudeˆncia into a su´mula, the
su´mula has more weight than jurisprudeˆncia. That is, in the hierarchy of
authorities (from low to high), we ﬁnd jurisprudeˆncias, su´mulas, and
su´mulas vinculantes. Thus, if an RE can show that the challenged lower
6. Authors’ translation (original: “que ultrapassem os interesses subjetivos da causa”).
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decision cuts against even an evolving line of cases on the STF, general
repercussions are presumed. This presumption implicitly affords even
evolving lines of jurisprudence greater objective constitutional weight,
encouraging judges to think more systematically about the way they
decide every one of their cases. Combined with the incentives to consider
how individual decisions might be consolidated into an SV, these new
rules regarding REs constitute a meaningful increase in the policy-
making authority of the court.
In addition to the institutional change in 2004, a parallel political trans-
formation affected the composition of the STF. The Workers’ Party presi-
dential victory in 2002 brought the party to the nation’s highest ofﬁce in
2003. Long regarded as the only large programmatic party in Brazil, the
ascent of the PT to the presidency can be expected to lead to a more
political appointment strategy, with the appointer—new president Luiz
Ina´cio Lula da Silva (Lula)—seeking to pack the court with friendly par-
tisans. These changes suggest an increasing politicization of the court
which may result in a new attitudinal judicial politics for Brazil, especially
in combination with the institutional change outlined above. Previously,
judges had little obvious identiﬁcation with any political party—even the
party of the president that appointed them. But beginning with the ﬁrst PT
administration of President Lula, appointees have had clearer ties to party
(Kapiszewski 2010: 55 note 5). Perhaps the most obvious example is Dias
Toffoli, who was attorney for a major national labor union (Central U´nica
dos Trabalhadores, CUT), legal counsel for the PT in the Chamber of
Deputies, worked on Lula’s political campaigns, and was also Lula’s
Solicitor General (Advogado Geral da Unia˜o, AGU) before being nomi-
nated to the court in 2009.7
To be sure, we are not saying that no STF judge before Lula had any
kind of political background. Nelson Jobim was so closely tied to the
Cardoso administration after his appointment in 1997, having ﬁrst been
Minister of Justice, that he was called the “leader of the government on the
STF”, and together with Cardoso’s other two justices was considered the
“government’s bench” (bancada governista; ISTOE´ 2000). At least six
pre-Lula justices held formal elected ofﬁce prior to joining the STF, and
ﬁve of these justices held at least one elected ofﬁce at the federal level.8 An
additional justice, Francisco Rezek, was appointed to the court in 1983,
resigned to be Collor’s Minister of Foreign Relations (i.e., Secretary of
State) in 1990, and was later re-appointed by Collor to the court in 1992.9
7. Unless otherwise noted, all data on justices’ background is from the STFwebsite, which
contains biographies and resumes for all justices.
8. Rafael Mayer (mayor), Oscar Correa (state deputy; federal deputy); Paulo Brossard
(state deputy; federal deputy; senator); Celio Borja (state deputy and three terms as federal
deputy); Mauricio Correa (senator); Nelson Jobim (federal deputy).
9. Prior to joining the court in 1983, Rezek was a federal prosecutor during 12 years
(1972–83) of the military regime, rising to Deputy Attorney General (Subprocurador-geral
da Republica) in 1979.
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Multiple justices held appointed ofﬁce at different levels of government,
including Gilmar Mendes (appointed by Cardoso), who like Dias Toffoli
just mentioned, was AGU.10
However, these other justices have been spread out over several admin-
istrations. In contrast, aside from Dias Toffoli, four more of Lula’s eight
nominations held appointed positions in local or federal government
(Carlos Britto, Eros Grau, Ricardo Lewandowski, and Menezes
Direito), and only three of the eight had previously been judges (Cezar
Peluso, Lewandowski, and Direito). Indeed, at least one journalistic ac-
count reports statements by Lula that show he sought to place sympa-
thetic, leftist judges on the bench. In August 2007, the STF was populated
with six justices selected by Lula—a majority—and was deciding a major
case involving the alleged corruption of many of his party’s politicians (in
a scandal known as the mensala˜o). As he witnessed the justices he had
selected vote against the PT politicians, he reportedly complained, ‘all
those leftist judges that I nominated are voting against me.” According
to another journalistic account, the selection of the more apolitical, “tech-
nical,” or legalist Menezes Direito the following month was due in part to
Lula’s frustrated reaction to the way his earlier preference for left-leaning
judges had backﬁred in this one case (Studart 2007).
We believe these two changes—the increasing policy-making authority
of the court and the increasingly partisan composition of the court—drive
a paradigm shift in judicial decision making in Brazil, from a latent par-
tisan cleavage to a patent one. Notably, if the cleavage appears before any
institutional change, the primary dynamic is attitudinal and there is little
conditioning effect of the institutional reform. However, if the cleavage
appears or deepens after the institutional changes, then we can conclude
that a partisan cleavage that remains latent under conditions of weak
policy-making authority is activated by reforms that increase that author-
ity. The above discussion yields two core hypotheses:
H1: Compositional Change: Cleavages on the court are driven
by changes in the court’s composition, with the arrival of
President Lula’s appointments. More speciﬁcally, Judicial
behavior on the STF should become more partisan or
ideological after June 2003, when PT-appointed judges
reach the court.
H2: Policy-making authority affects judicial behavior. Latent
partisan divisions are activated once judges’ decisions
have broad policy-making authority. Judicial behavior on
the STF should become more partisan or ideological after
10. Aside from federal elected ofﬁce, Brossard, Mauricio Correa, and Jobim also held the
appointed ofﬁce of Minister of Justice. Gilmar Mendes was Cardoso’s Solicitor General
(AGU) prior to joining the Court.
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January 1, 2005, in response to the judicial reform of 2004
expanding policy-making authority.
To be clear, we do not anticipate being able to differentiate between liberal
and conservative justices, as the attitudinal literature tends to do in the
United States (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Sunstein et al. 2006). Rather, we
expect to distinguish nonpartisan patterns of collegial decision making
from patterns marked by partisan cleavages. We turn now to our empir-
ical analysis.
5. Data and Results
We test our hypotheses by examining constitutional decisions for evidence
of changes in judicial behavior in response to institutional reforms and
different nomination patterns. Using both a spatial model and a nonpara-
metric method, we compare patterns of judicial decision making before
and after the key reforms, and before and after the Lula administration.
For each part of the analysis, our critical test is whether justices divide on
partisan lines or not. We discuss our data below then present our methods
and results.
We collected data on every Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (Ac¸a˜o
Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, or ADI) over the course of more than two
decades between 1989 and 2010. These decisions include both merit and
procedural questions. Virtually every ADI begins with a procedural issue
when the plaintiff ﬁles a request for an injunction (called either liminar or
medida cautelar), seeking that the underlying state action be suspended
until a ﬁnal decision on the merits. Further, procedural questions fre-
quently arise about whether the case should proceed to the merits.
These procedural questions include issues about standing, mootness,
and jurisdiction. Thus, there are generally at least two decisions for each
ADI—the injunction and the merits decision—and frequently a third pro-
cedural decision.11 There were over 10,000 ADI decisions between March
1, 1989, and June 18, 2010. Of these, 1258 had some dissension, that is, are
nonunanimous, and are therefore included in our analysis.12
11. In some of these constitutional cases there were as many as three separate procedural
issues and as many as nine total decisions.
12. All data are from STF website (www.stf.jus.br), last accessed November 17, 2011.
Some readers may be skeptical of the focus on nonunanimous decisions or wonder how our
ﬁndings extend to unanimous cases. Existing literature ﬁnds that unanimous cases are more
likely in easy cases, or in cases where the court is seeking consensus to ensure external legit-
imacy or compliance with a ruling (see, e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998; Baum 2006). As noted
by Songer and Siripurapu (2009), unanimity is also likely where legal constraints restrict the
range of decisions, or where strong norms of collegiality exist. Further, quantitative work is
not well-suited to identify either of these factors (Songer and Siripurapu: 88–89), so qualita-
tive work on Brazil’s high court would be more suited to identify, as Kapiszewski (2012) does,
these norms of consensus and collegiality. Of course, the fact that many cases are easy or
constrained by legal rules, or that some consensus and collegiality exists, does not mean that
ideological differences disappear. For instance, the rate of unanimity on the US Supreme
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We note that there were many other types of cases, and many other
decisions (unanimous and nonunanimous) during the same time period.
The Brazilian STF does not control its docket (unlike the US Supreme
Court), and must process every case ﬁled, though this has changed some-
what after the 2004 reform required some types of cases to meet additional
criteria in order to be accepted at the court (e.g., as noted above, recursos
extraordina´rios, REs, must show that the legal issue has general effects or
“repercussa˜o geral” among the population). Since 1988, the volume of
cases has been increasing dramatically. In 2010 alone, the court decided
103,869 cases and received 71,670 new cases. Contrast this with the
8159 cases ﬁled at the US Supreme Court, of which the Court accepted
only 82.13
We limited our analysis to decisions on ADI cases for two reasons.
First, practically, we do not have the resources to collect data on all
STF decisions (a total of well over one million at the close of 2009).
Although summaries of the decisions are available online, accurate
coding of judicial decisions requires reading the case summaries and
searching for decisions. A simple web-scraping program would inaccur-
ately code justice positions, and lead to inaccurate results, because elec-
tronic summaries fail to distinguish between justices that take a minority
Court increased from 2008 (33%) to 2012 (49%). As of April 11, 75% of the USSC cases
have been decided unanimously, with only a single case (McCutcheon v. FEC) decided by a
5–4 vote (see Bhatia 2013; though most of the divided opinions are likely to come in June,
towards the end of the term). Despite the rising unanimity and despite McCutcheon repre-
senting a small sample (n¼ 1), most observers would agree that the single 5–4 decision in
McCutcheon is fairly representative of the ideological division on the court. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg agrees with Justice Clarence Thomas 79% of the time, but that high level of
agreement does not negate differences between the two. Indeed, the same methods we employ
are used in the United States to estimate judicial ideal points of the US Supreme Court
(Martin and Quinn 2002). Lastly, while in the paper we are making claims about the content
of the partisan cleavage on the court after 2004, we are using the same kind of non-unani-
mous decision data to look at patterns in decision-making over time. Our main ﬁnding is
that—using this same non-unanimous data to examine the Brazilian STF’s longitudinal
trajectory since 1988—the current partisan cleavage is a new phenomenon coming on the
heels of the 2004 reform. If we had used different data for different time periods, we would be
in a weaker analytic position. But we ﬁnd this new cleavage using the same kind of data over
time, diluting the criticism that our ﬁndings are an artifact of the non-unanimous data.
We further note that this is a general feature of most decision-making bodies—there are
many more unanimous, uncontroversial decisions than there are divisive decisions. Some
large legislatures use voice votes or similar mechanisms to quickly pass large numbers of
bills that enjoy widespread support. These are typically administrative decisions or policy/
precedent improvements that everyone agrees on. There may be hundreds of such decisions
for each controversial roll call in many voting bodies. In that sense, these decisions are not as
important. The real question is, when there are contentious issues before a decision-making
body, are there regular patterns of division reﬂecting enduring differences of opinion and
preference? Our results show that there is a new pattern of partisan division on the STF.
13. Supreme Court of the United States (USSC). “2010 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary,” Appendix p.9 (December 31, 2010); available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx (last viewed February 12, 2011).
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position, and those that were absent or abstained. In other words, the
summaries only report the names of judges that were in the majority,
and do not list those absent or in the minority. Distinguishing between
“not present,” “recused,” and “nay” requires a careful reading of the de-
cision. Consequently, any web-scraping analysis would be making the
unrealistic assumption that all absences were in fact minority position-
taking.
Second, given that we must limit our analysis to a subset of cases, the
ADIs generally include many of the most important cases. To be clear,
ADIs are not the only mechanism by which the constitutionality of state
actions can be challenged. Kapiszewski (2010; 2011a; 2011b), for instance,
analyzes 55 important cases adjudicated by the STF between 1989 and
2004, and 24 of these cases were not ADIs. Further, REs are the most
frequent, if lower proﬁle, mechanism of review.14 Still, more than half of
the important cases identiﬁed by Kapiszewski—speciﬁcally, 31 cases—
were ADIs, showing that this mechanism is a central avenue of
constitutional review, arguably the most important. Notably, the 1988
constitution expanded standing but still allows only nine actors to initiate
ADIs—the President, the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies (lower house
of Congress), the Attorney General (Procurador Geral da Repu´blica,
PGR), the legislature of a State or the Federal District, the governor of
a State or of the Federal District, the national bar association (Ordem dos
Advogados do Brasil, OAB), political parties with representation in the
national Congress, and federal unions or other federal professional asso-
ciations (e.g., the national judges’ association, Associac¸a˜o dosMagistrados
Brasileiros, AMB).
Our empirical analysis is focused on testing whether there is any evi-
dence that institutional reform increasing the policy-making authority of
judges generates a partisan cleavage. Existing research consistently ﬁnds
that the STF is distinctly nonideological. However, prior studies have
examined smaller time periods and smaller samples of cases, so we are
cognizant that our broader analysis may yield new ﬁndings. Importantly,
any ﬁnding of a partisan cleavage would cut against the consensus that the
STF justices behave nonideologically, provoking a reassessment of the
sources of behavior on the STF. More speciﬁcally, such a ﬁnding would
refocus our attention on the institutional conditions that dampen or
enable the expression of partisan preferences.
Empirically, we wish to see whether the Court divides along political
lines when making decisions. Ideally, we would have some direct measure
of each judge’s ideology, but as is the case with most judicial scholarship,
no such information exists. But we can categorize judges according to the
party of their nominating president, a standard practice for judicial studies
(e.g., Sunstein et al. 2006). The long-time period we study includes judges
14. More than 13,000 were ﬁled in 2010 alone (http://www.stf.jus.br; last viewed May 31,
2012).
Power, Composition, and Decision Making 549
nominated by military presidents, as well as ﬁve civilian presidents from
four parties (PMDB, PRN, PSDB, and PT).15
Methodologically, we use two broad approaches with very different
assumptions to test for ideological differences. First, following much
of the literature on judicial politics, we estimate judicial ideal points on
decisions using methods derived from a spatial model, and test for sys-
tematic differences across political parties in a low-dimensional space.
Second, using a more ﬂexible nonparametric method, we test for cleavages
between judges based on their partisanship, combining all dimensions
simultaneously.
We begin by exploring patterns in the distribution of ideal points using
the spatial model, the current standard for measuring judicial preferences,
understanding the policy space, and analyzing judicial coalitions and
other secondary quantities of interest. The foundations of the model are
that decisions and justices can be represented in a judicial ideology space
of one or more dimensions, and that decisions reﬂect preferences or beliefs
of judges about the best policy outcome. The typical approach to model
judges’ decisions is to begin by assuming that judges have single peaked
preferences in a low dimensional space that captures all decisions. Each
vote by a justice supports either position A or position B.16 In this envir-
onment, judges will decide for A when
Ui Aj
 
> Ui Bj
 
and for B when
Ui Aj
 
< Ui Bj
 
where i indexes judges, j indexes decisions, andU is the function that maps
legislators’ preferences onto each case. Typically, U is a function of the
distance from judge i’s ideal point i and the impact of a case decision for
position A or position B, plus some random error:
Ui Aj
  ¼ f i;Aj
 
+"ijA
Ui Bj
  ¼ f i;Bj
 
+"ijB
The speciﬁc form for f is chosen to be a monotonic function of the
distance between i and Aj, with typical choices of f being gaussian or
quadratic. Estimation is achieved using maximum-likelihood, nonpara-
metric, or markov-chain monte carlo (MCMC) methods. Because we
are analyzing a small decision-making body, we use Poole’s (2000)
Optimal Classiﬁcation, a nonparametric estimation technique.
15. Presidents Sarney and Franco were both nominally members of the PMDB, the Party
of theDemocraticMovement of Brazil. Neither were committed partisans, and neither stayed
in the party after their terms ended.
16. In typical roll-call applications, these are presented as a status quo and alternative.
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6. Results
Figure 1 shows justice ideal points when combining all case data from the
period 1990 to 2010. Appointing presidents are represented by colors, with
Lula’s justices as red, Cardoso’s as dark blue, Collor’s as light blue,
Franco’s as cyan, Sarney’s as black, and the military presidents’ justices
as green.
The obvious trend in the data is the division of the court according to
justices’ appointing presidents. Lula’s justices all occupy the far left of the
ideal space. With few exceptions, all other justices are on the other side of
the ideal space. The remainder of the justices are on the right half of the
graph, and the array of ideal points hints at other presidential differences,
but only weakly. Note for example that on the ﬁrst dimension, the
Cardoso appointees have very similar locations, as do most Collor ap-
pointees, and most military (green) appointees. The Sarney appointees are
perhaps the most diverse—occupying center left and right positions.
The ﬁrst dimension spread roughly corresponds to what one would
expect ideologically, with the Workers’ Party at one end, the Cardoso
judges in the middle, and the Collor and military presidents further to
the other side. The only exception is the Sarney administration, whose
judges are spread around the center of the space. This space may indeed
correspond roughly to a traditional left-right spectrum, but it could also
encompass other dimensions of judicial disagreement.17
The outlier on the second dimension isMarco Aurelio. Justice Aurelio is
known for erratic independence and for being an “obstructionist” on the
court—and perhaps not making decisions according to the spatial model
described above (see Appendix A). Anecdotes from judicial staff tell of
cases where Aurelio argued eloquently against a bill, but when his argu-
ments succeeded in swaying the court, he changed his position so that he
would still be in the minority group! This erratic behavior violates key
assumptions of the spatial model, so we exclude this justice from the rest of
the spatial analysis.18
A scree plot (not shown) suggests low dimensionality to the space, with
results consistent with a one-dimensional voting matrix. The ﬁrst dimen-
sion explains about twice as much variance in the roll-call space than any
higher dimension, and a test of dimensionality fails to reject the null hy-
pothesis that the space is unidimensional.19
17. We read approximately 10 of the cases with near vertical cutting lines (those that
deﬁne the ﬁrst dimension space). Our early analysis does not suggest any obvious trend in
the space. Fully exploring the nature of this conﬂict is beyond the scope of this paper but
addressed in a separate working paper available from the authors.
18. We also generated a version of Figure 1 excluding Marco Aurelio, but there were no
major differences in the distribution of ideal points.
19. We randomly generated multiple unidimensional data matrices of equal size and rank
as that of the Brazilian Supreme court, then tested the dimensionality of these. Any deviations
from unidimensionality in this case would be due to random error—because we generated the
data from a unidimensional model. The typical scree plot from this simulation was similar to
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We supplement the visual analysis with a formal test for the relationship
between appointing president and ideal points by comparing the mean
ideal point of each president’s appointees. More formally, let justices’
ideal points be a function of their appointing president’s ideal point and
a random error:
ij ¼  j+"ij
where ij is the ideal point of the i-th justice appointed by president j,  j is
the mean ideal point for president j’s justices, and "ij is the random error.
With standard assumptions about the distribution of the "’s, this trans-
lates into an analysis of variance model, where the null hypothesis is that
the presidential means are all equal to the grand mean, and the alternative
is that the presidential means vary.
ANOVA of course has at least two problems here. The ﬁrst is that it is a
one-dimensional analysis, though we have estimated two dimensions of
ideal points. The second is that there are not enough judges to reach
Figure 1. Judicial Ideal Points, 1990–2010.
that produced by our data, meaning we cannot reject the null hypothesis of just one
dimension.
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standard minimum dataset sizes for this method. In response, we also
show results for a MANOVA and for a Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric
test, which is rank-based and robust in small datasets.
Table 1 shows results from these tests on several subsets of the data. The
ﬁrst two columns show results when jointly analyzing all judges and de-
cisions over the 20 years of cases we collected. The ﬁrst has all judges; the
second drops the erratic Justice Aurelio. The results in Columns 1 and 2
are almost identical, and tell the same story as Figure 1: the groupings of
judges by appointing president are statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst di-
mension ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis, and for the MANOVA. The second
dimension differences are also signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant.
Our results are robust, signiﬁcant, and visually striking—and they dis-
agree with most of the existing literature on the Brazilian STF. Previous
work almost unanimously characterizes the court as a highly professional,
nonideological court where decisions are always made on the basis of legal
arguments or pragmatic, apolitical concerns, such as macroeconomic con-
siderations regarding national stability. Our results show that this is
indeed not the case! There is a strong divide on the court that corresponds
to the president who made the appointment.
The division is primarily driven by a divide between President Lula’s
many appointees, and the rest of the court, with weaker evidence of div-
isions for earlier appointees. Indeed, we also tried running our analysis
with just a single covariate—an indicator variable for “appointed by
Lula.” We tested this model against one including all the presidential
indicator variables. The statistical analysis suggests that the cleavage is
between Lula appointees and other appointees; we could not reject the null
that, once controlling for Lula appointees, none of the other presidential
appointments signiﬁcantly improved the ﬁt (p-value¼ 0.72; results not
shown).
This aggregate analysis suggests a transformation of the STF, with a
cleavage that has accompanied the rise of the Workers’ Party (PT). But do
these changes reﬂect institutional reforms, or attitudinal diversity asso-
ciated with President Lula’s appointments? To explore our hypotheses, we
continue our analysis by analyzing subsets of decisions. We begin by
examining two sets of decisions—all decisions before Lula’s administra-
tion (1990–2002), and decisions during the Lula administration (2003–10).
We ﬁrst look for evidence of ideological decision making from the pre-
Lula period. Figure 2 compares the distribution of judicial ideal points for
the pre-Lula period, before any Workers’ Party appointments reached the
court, and after. The pre-Lula graph shows no clear or obvious pattern of
groupings by appointing president. The Collor, Sarney, and military ap-
pointees span the entire space, vertically and horizontally. The handful of
Cardoso and Franco appointees are clustered, but so few that they do not
suggest any trend. Column 3 of Table 1 tests for signiﬁcant differences
between group means (ranks, for Kruskal-Wallis) for the pre-Lula period.
None of the ﬁve tests on any dimension 1 or dimension 2 was signiﬁcant.
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Figure 3 examines the distribution of judicial ideal points for STF de-
cisions after 2003, that is, after President Lula of the PT (Workers’ Party)
began appointing judges. The ﬁgure is not as clean as Figure 1, but does
show a clear separation between the PT justices and the rest of the court.
Again, other presidents’ appointees are also grouped, though less de-
cisively than before, which is not surprising given the smaller dataset
available when restricting analysis to these eight years. Column 4 of
Table 1 tests for signiﬁcant appointing-president differences. Results
here are not as strong as before, but still very consistent. Using the
Kruskal-Wallis and ANOVA tests, there are signiﬁcant differences be-
tween judges based on their appointing presidents. The multidimensional
MANOVA also ﬁnds a signiﬁcant difference between group means. The
second dimension in this case, however, does not reveal signiﬁcant group
differences.
Is the new cleavage just the result of PT versus non-PT conﬂict, as the
ﬁrst PT appointed judges join the court? Or does it reﬂect institutional
change? We might divide the Lula administration into two time periods:
the two years before the judicial reform, and the six years after the judicial
Table 1. Analysis of Variance on Judicial Ideal Points as a Function of Appointing
President
All Cases Without Outlier Pre-PT Post-PT
1990–2010 1990–2010 1990–2002 2003–2010
ANOVA
Dimension 1
F-statistic 6.59 8.26 1.703 3.39
p-Value <0.001**** <0.001**** 0.195 0.034**
Dimension 2
F-statistic 1.94 3.22 0.42 1.732
p-Value 0.126 0.03** 0.817 0.109
MANOVA
F-statistic 3.68 4.98 0.96 2.71
p-Value 0.001*** <0.001**** 0.607 0.021**
Kruskal-Wallis
Dimension 1
K-W chi-squared 17.10 18.42 8.38 13.152
p-Value 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.136 0.041*
Dimension 2
K-W chi-squared 11.76 13.82 2.90 9.573
p-Value 0.067* 0.03** 0.716 0.144
Excludes Marco Aurelio? No Yes Yes Yes
Number of judges 25 24 16 13
*¼ 0.10, **¼ 0.05, ***¼ 0.01, ****¼ 0.001.
The table above tests for cohort differences in ideal points for different periods using a variety of methods. In each
case, the dependent variable is the judicial ideal point and the independent variable is a set of indicator variables
for the appointing president. Each set of results tests whether there are signiﬁcant differences in ideal points when
comparing the judges appointed by different presidents. Results suggest that there are differences in judges but
these differences only appeared after President Lula began appointing judges to the court, and results are robust to
the removal of an outlier.
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reform. If the new cleavage is just the result of PT appointments to the
court, then we should see the cleavage in both periods. If, however, the
increase in constitutional authority activates partisan cleavage and
changes judicial behavior, then this separation should only appear after
the 2004 reforms took effect. Indeed, when splitting the two periods, the
results are only signiﬁcant after the reforms (not shown).20 However, these
results rely on few observations and fairly heroic assumptions. For a more
robust test, we turn to a nonparametric method.
7. Permutation Analysis
To complement our spatial analysis, we also applied a nonparametric
permutation approach. This approach resolves three potential problems
with the spatial model. First, there is a lifecycle or generational bias in
ideal point estimation that occurs naturally when analyzing long
Figure 2. Pre-Lula Ideal Points, 1990–2002.
20. In this case, the assumptions of our tests are questionable as the number of judges is
very small. As an alternative, below, we apply a nonparametric analysis that conﬁrms these
results.
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legislative periods. Often in such cases, judges (and legislators) ideal points
are jointly estimated into a single space although they may have never
served on the same court. In Brazil, with a mandatory retirement age,
there has been substantial turnover on the court. In the 20 years in our
study, a total of 29 different justices served on the court, which has 11
seats.21 The result is that our analysis jointly estimates ideal points for
justices chosen by military presidents in the 1980s as well as justices se-
lected by the ﬁrst leftist president since the military coup of 1964, President
Lula. When estimating ideal points with such generational data, there is a
natural bias in ideal point estimation toward separation by generation; the
nonparametric method suffers no such bias.22
The second advantage of a nonspatial model is that it aggregates all
dimensions, instead of just relying on the low dimensional space typically
estimated. In our case, the predictive power of the ﬁrst two dimensions in
Figure 3. Ideal Points under Lula, 2003–2010.
21. Over the past 20 years, only 17 justices have served on the nine-seat United States’
Supreme Court.
22. We show this in a separate working paper.
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this analysis, while substantial, was lower than in many judicial bodies.
The nonparametric permutation technique detects voting blocs without
any constraints of dimensionality. The method we use has been discussed
elsewhere in the literature (Desposato 2003; 2004) and software for con-
ducting the analysis is available through the R computing platform.
Finally, the ANOVA analysis conducted on a small dataset with fewer
than 30 judges risks violating that method’s assumptions; permutation
analysis has no such limitations with small datasets.
Table 2 shows results from a nonparametric test for presidential cleav-
ages in justice decisions. The permuted range shows the range of mean
justice-president cohesion that would be expected just due to chance. The
ﬁgures are Rice cohesion scores for each justice–president coalition—
treating each president’s appointees as a voting bloc, just as legislative
studies examine parties (Desposato 2003). The observed score is the
mean cohesion for these voting blocs. There is evidence of president-
based splits in decisions whenever the actual cohesion is higher than the
range of permuted values. The last column reports the effective p-value—
this is the percentage of permuted scores that are larger than the actual
scores (if the p-value is 0.05, that means that only 5% of permuted values
are greater than the actual observed score, suggesting signiﬁcance at the
0.05 level). Note as well that this permutation analysis automatically ad-
justs for any small bloc inﬂation of cohesion scores.
The results parallel the ideal point analysis, and conﬁrm our earlier
ﬁndings. When lumping the entire period, there is a small but statistically
signiﬁcant effect: justices, on average, appear to be split into blocs for
decision making. However, when we just look at the pre-Lula period,
there is no evidence of signiﬁcant splits into decision blocs based on presi-
dential appointments.
Conversely, just looking at the Lula period, there are consistently sig-
niﬁcant voting bloc effects nomatter howwe parse the data. Looking at all
justices, and treating each set of presidential appointments as a different
voting bloc, observed voting bloc cohesion exceeds all 10,000 permuted
values—evidence of cleavages signiﬁcant at the 0.0001 level. We also com-
pared two other approaches. In the ﬁrst, noting Marco Aurelio’s erratic
behavior, we dropped him from the analysis. This had no impact on our
results. In the second, we lumped all the non-Lula judges together in a
single bloc and compared Lula and non-Lula appointees’ behavior. In this
case, if our results persisted they provide evidence that the key cleavage is
between the Lula appointees and earlier justices—as suggested by our
spatial analysis. Again, there was evidence of cleavages, signiﬁcant at
the 0.0001 level.
Our critical test again is comparing the decisions from the Lula admin-
istration, before and after the reform. A test for ideological cleavages for
the ﬁrst two years of the Lula administration (2003–04) and the last six
years (2005–10) is included in the table, and conﬁrms our hypotheses:
there is no signiﬁcant party-based division on the court—even with the
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presence of PT-appointed judges—until the judicial reform takes effect.
An effective p-value from the permutation analysis is 0.16. After the
reform, there is a stark difference—the permutation analysis reveals a
consistent party cleavage on judicial decisions, signiﬁcant beyond the
0.0001 level.
There are several other notable features of the data that deserve atten-
tion. Note ﬁrst that all the cohesion scores are relatively low when com-
pared with party cohesion in legislatures. For instance, in Brazil, party
cohesion scores generally range from 0.70 to 0.85, and can be as high as
0.97 (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995). The implication is that, while cleav-
ages exist, they are substantially less rigid and consistent than those
observed in legislative parties.
Combined, the ideal point estimates and the permutation analysis sup-
port Hypothesis 2. The cleavage on the Brazilian high court does not
appear until after the 2004 reform increased judicial policy-making au-
thority. There is no evidence that it emerged after a weaker reform in 1999,
no evidence that it emerged with President Cardoso’s appointments, and
no evidence that it emerged with President Lula’s pre-reform appoint-
ments to the court.
8. From Majority Splits to Qualitative Analysis
These quantitative results are consistent, robust to multiple methods, and
suggest a fundamental transformation in the court. For additional evi-
dence, we examined a case in which all Lula judges voted as a block to
analyze the arguments employed by judges within those cases and to try
Table 2. Group Cohesion: Permutation Analysis of Cleavages on STF by Appointing
President
Permuted range Observed Effective
signiﬁcance
Entire period (0.631, 0.666) 0.665 0.0002
Pre-Lula: 1990–2002 (0.634, 0.677) 0.652 0.615
Lula: 2003–2010
All justices (0.602, 0.670) 0.697 <0.0001
Without Marco Aurelio (0.561, 0.643) 0.648 <0.0001
Lula / Anti-Lula blocs only (0.564, 0.646) 0.648 <0.0001
Lula: before and after reforms
Pre-reform (2003–04) (0.603, 0.746) 0.691 0.159
Post-reform (2005–2010) (0.585, 0.663) 0.699 <0.0001
The permuted and observed values are average Rice cohesion scores, calculated across all cohors and decisions.
Voting cohorts are deﬁned by appointing president. Permuted scores show the full range of cohesion scores
observed when randomly assigning votes to groups. Observed scores show actual mean cohesion. When observed
cohesion is signiﬁcantly higher than randomly permuted cohesion, this is evidence that judges are voting together in
groups deﬁned by appointing president. In the table above, ﬁgures show signiﬁcant voting decisions emerged after
Lula’s appointment of PT judges to the court and after signiﬁcant reforms took effect in 2005.
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to identify the nature of the separation of Lula’s judges from others.
Leveraging the majority splits analysis to identify exemplars, ADI 1194
emerges as an illustrative case.23 This decision on the merits considered
whether it was constitutional for a law to require that any documents
establishing legal personality (e.g., to register a small business or organ-
ization) would be legally void if not reviewed and approved by an attor-
ney. This was important because it pitted the liberty interest of individuals
to form commercial or civic organizations against the institutional interest
of the legal profession to maintain a source of business activity and
income, as well as the public interest in ensuring that business and civic
organizations were operating properly. The majority found this provision
constitutional, agreeing with the national bar association (OAB) that
there were potential harms from improper contracts that could be avoided
if all individuals seeking legal personhood were required to consult an
attorney. Thus, the majority voted to support the lawyers’ association
that an attorney’s services were always required in order to form a busi-
ness or civic organization. This majority consisted of Mauricio Correa,
Nelson Jobim, Sepulveda Pertence, Carlos Velloso, Celso de Mello, and
Ellen Gracie. None of the Lula justices were in the majority. The minority,
on the other hand, was composed of ﬁve justices, three of which were Lula
appointees: Carlos Britto (Lula), Cezar Peluso (Lula), Joaquim Barbosa
(Lula), Gilmar Mendes (Cardoso), and Marco Aurelio (Collor).
The Lulista-heavy minority argued the provision was unconstitutional,
ﬁnding that it was corporatist in generating more income for lawyers (e.g.,
Peluso at 75), and emphasizing that such a law violated core principles of
legal interpretation, as well as basic individual rights and liberties of as-
sociation. Two things differentiate the minority position: an appeal to
principles, even from international or comparative law, and an appeal
to substantive due process. While Mendes writes the lead dissent, elabor-
ating on principles of necessity and proportionality, as well as bureau-
cratic efﬁciency (e.g., Mendes at 36, 86), his arguments are rather stiff and
procedural compared with those of Lula judges. The Lula judges join
Mendes in ﬁnding the provision unconstitutional; however, all of the
Lula judges—Barbosa, Britto, and Peluso—go well beyond Mendes to
emphasize basic principles related to individual liberties, rights, and guar-
antees. The tenor of these arguments evokes the rights-protectiveness of
neoconstitutional proﬁles seen elsewhere in the region. Barbosa opposes
the law because it infringes fundamental liberties of association, com-
merce, and contract (72). Britto opposes the law because it offends indi-
vidual rights and liberties (73). And Peluso opposes the law based in part
on the principle of substantive due process (75–76). Overall, all three Lula
justices appeal to principles—emphasizing individual rights and liber-
ties—, whereas the justices in the majority make rather formal, textual
23. Full-text versions of decisions cited in this section are available at the STF web site,
stf.jus.br.
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readings of the constitutional provisions (e.g., Correa’s majority opinion,
at 26). Indeed, Jobim criticizes Mendes, who was with Lula’s justices in the
minority, and his appeal to underlying principles, accusing him of German
essentialism and stating this essentialism cuts against the preferred guid-
ance of positivists like Brazilian Julio de Castilhos (84). The principles-
versus-positivism divide between Lula and non-Lula justices, respectively
(with the exception of Mendes), suggests that the dissension of Lula just-
ices is motivated in part by a more progressive view of constitutional
interpretation, which would also overlap or coincide with a more left-
leaning ideological perspective.
The reference to substantive due process is remarkable in a civil law
country and further evidence of the nature of this split. Procedural due
process stands for the proposition that there are certain constitutionally
recognized rights and that the government cannot infringe on these rights
without going through an appropriate set of procedures. This is what is
commonly understood as due process. However, substantive due process
goes one step further and says that there are some substantive rights,
though perhaps not enumerated in the constitution, that cannot be
infringed upon. This doctrine is controversial even in the United States,
and has been used to ﬁnd conservative economic rights in the late 19th
century and early 20th century, and later to ﬁnd progressive social rights in
the late 20th century. In either case, the right is not enumerated but can be
inferred from the overall structure of procedural protections. For in-
stance, the right to “privacy” in progressive reproductive rights jurispru-
dence in the United States is not enumerated, but was inferred from other
due process provisions. Thus, the fact a Lula-appointed justice is appeal-
ing to a rights-expansive principle, and one that is controversial in other
parts of the world, is further evidence that the division between Lula and
non-Lula judges is ideological.
9. Discussion
A growing literature on the Brazilian judiciary suggests that this institu-
tion is immune from the politicization observed in other courts, especially
the United States. According to this research, judges make decisions based
on their understandings of legal issues or on other pragmatic consider-
ations, and ideology plays little role in outcomes or behavior. Most of this
work is based on case studies by scholars and legal observers, but the core
conclusions are also supported by econometric analyses (e.g., Taylor 2008;
Oliveira 2008; Jaloretto and Mueller 2011). Our results cut against all of
these previous ﬁndings.
In this paper, we have examined all available ADI decisions through
June 2010. Analysis of all decisions in this important class of constitu-
tional cases during this period found a clear ideological dimension to the
ideal space of the Brazilian Supreme Court, driven almost entirely by the
appointees of President Lula (2003–10). Decisions prior to his tenure
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showed no impact of appointing president on ideal point or outcomes. But
adding the Lula justices to the court fundamentally changed the judicial
space, with a clear division between judges appointed by Lula and other
appointees. Furthermore, these cleavages appear after the implementation
of a major judicial reform that greatly enhanced the policy-making au-
thority of judges. These results suggest an important transition in this civil
law judiciary—from a legalist, formalist approach to decision making to a
broader, activist, attitudinal model.
The challenge for us—and other scholars of judicial politics—is to
understand why and how this change has occurred, and what these pat-
terns imply about comparative judicial behavior. We believe—but cannot
establish deﬁnitively—that the two changes we discussed earlier played an
important role in this evolution. First, the judicial reform that dramatic-
ally increased the impact of every STF decision and therefore augmented
judicial authority, and second, the rise of the disciplined and ideological
PT and its capturing of the presidency in 2002 (and again in 2006, and
2010!).
We believe that the judicial reform affected the STF both directly and
indirectly. Directly, the increased inﬂuence of the court has brought more
focus on programmatic motivations for judicial decisions, and more pres-
sure. Before the 2004 reforms, decisions at the STF applied only to the
case at hand and had no broader impact. The interested parties were
usually relatively few in number, the scope and impact limited, and the
press, politicians, and citizens had little reason to monitor the court. The
rise of the su´mula vinculante, even if few in number, means that STF
decisions have the potential for far greater implications for lower courts
and other public authorities. Coupled with the rise of an objective framing
or way of thinking about all constitutional litigation, the stakes of each
decision have increased manifold. The court is a far more signiﬁcant and
centralizing political actor since 2004. For judges, this implies strong in-
centives to apply broad principled arguments to their decisions—drawing
on their judicial ideology—rather than narrow, case-speciﬁc consider-
ations. Given the diversity of judges on the court, the result was a new
cleavage.
Indirectly, the reforms could change appointment strategy, especially
over the longer term. With new sweeping powers vested in the STF, stra-
tegic presidents should be more careful to appoint like-minded and
friendly justices who will side with the appointing president and carry
forward his or her policy legacy. In other words, presidents may have
new incentives to appoint increasingly political justices. This is exactly
the change observed: recent judicial appointees have held prior political
positions—Dias Toffoli is the starkest example—and only three of Lula’s
seven appointments held prior judgeships. This pattern cuts against the
conventional civil law standard of recruiting professional judges into these
positions, though again it is a matter of degree; Lula’s predecessors also
did some of this, but Lula did more of it and deliberately sought to place
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sympathetic, leftist judges on the court, as evidenced by his reactions
above when a decision was against him.
Of course, we cannot separate out the broader impact of the reforms on
appointment strategy and the changes wrought by the PT’s own nature.
As the most successful of Brazil’s parties, with high levels of organization
and discipline, it is not surprising that PT judicial appointments are them-
selves increasingly political, progressive, and aligned with the party. To be
clear, it is less likely that this is a division along a simple, left–right con-
tinuum, and more likely that it is a division according to schools of legal
interpretation, with the non-Lula judges standing for more positivist views
conventionally associated with civil law judges and Lula judges represent-
ing a more principled view associated with interpretivism or progressive
constitutionalism (see Couso 2010; Couso and Hilbink 2011; Rodriguez
Garavito 2011).
Future research will help resolve these issues; one promising avenue of
research—though labor intensive—would be to collect more data on re-
maining STF decisions. Our web-scraping found many other types of de-
cisions which could be used to examine judicial behavior more closely, but
as discussed above, coding these requires reading each case and entering
each decision by hand. We invite other scholars to join this research
agenda using the data from this project, released on our website.
For Brazil, the transition could be positive—or negative. On the posi-
tive side, increased attention and principled position taking may be an
important step toward modernizing Brazil’s legal system, improving the
business environment through a more efﬁcient and principled legal culture
and judicial decision process, and enhancing rights protections. More
broadly, the transition may reﬂect the maturation of the political envir-
onment, reﬂecting the evolution of the political system seen elsewhere, for
example, in legislative politics.
On the other hand, this transition could signal a new politicization of
the judiciary that destroys judicial autonomy and merely extends presi-
dential power. Since Brazilian justices must retire by age 70, there is more
turnover on that court than on many others, and most presidents can
appoint several justices to the court. Indeed, as of November 2011, the
Workers’ Party has won three consecutive presidential elections and seen
enough retirements (and one death) to be able to appoint eight of eleven
sitting justices—enough to overrule any minority opposed to deliberation,
and clearly an unprecedented supermajority. If President Dilma Rousseff
wins re-election in 2014, she will nominate replacements for two additional
justices that will be termed out by their age—guaranteeing 10 of 11
Supreme Court seats for the Workers’ Party. If the court is increasingly
politicized, this is a staggering concentration of power, and cause for
concern.
More broadly, for comparative judicial studies, our study of the
Brazilian Supreme Court provides an interesting illustration of transition
in the nature of judicial politics. The transition appears to be driven by
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institutional change combined with political change, while the broader
legal environment was held constant. Our results contribute to a growing
literature on judicial behavior in civil law settings, and especially to those
documenting changes in legal culture and a widening division between
more traditional, passive, positivist judges, and more progressive, active,
assertive, interpretivist judges like that documented in Spain, Chile, and
elsewhere (Hilbink 2007a; 2007b; 2012; Couso 2010; Huneeus 2010;
Ingram 2012). Thus, our ﬁndings challenge the existing literature on the
persistent, apolitical professionalism of the Brazilian STF, highlighting a
crucial new cleavage in Brazilian judicial politics, but also complement
recent studies that examine transformations in judicial behavior in the civil
law tradition.
Appendix A
Clarification Regarding Justice Marco Aurelio
The exclusion of Marco Aurelio’s dissents requires some clariﬁcation. Our
qualitative analysis of his judicial style, as well as a review of secondary
work suggests that his behavior is either nonspatial and erratic, or perhaps
on some higher dimensional space not shared by the other justices. Many
nonunanimous cases on the STF have just a single dissenter, Marco
Aurelio, and all evidence is that his behavior is as much driven by a
desire to be contrarian as by a well-deﬁned set of legal principles.
Furthermore, we note that in our nonparametric analysis, the inclusion
or exclusion of Justice Aurelio does not affect our results; our ﬁndings of
emerging cleavages are robust to his presence or absence. But on the low-
dimensional spatial analysis, his behavior—often alone in the minority—
dominates the judicial space, and warrants some consideration.
A 20-year retrospective of his career on the STF highlighted his reputa-
tion as a consistently lone dissenter and noted his “absolute
independence” and “trademark of divergence” (sina de divergir; Haidar
2010). His frequent solo dissents—paired with his fondness for being in
the media—caused many observers of the STF to think his dissents are due
more to whim and capriciousness than to principled conviction (Haidar
2010).24 Marco Aurelio himself stated in an interview that he “never made
a point of being part of any majority,” much less unanimity (quoted in
Haidar). Elsewhere, he has been quoted as saying that he and his collea-
gues are not on the court to agree with each other, emphasizing that they
are not “vaquinhas de prese´pio” (Pardelas 2008), a colloquialism that
24. Haidar notes that some of Marco Aurelio’s dissenting positions have later been
adopted as the Court’s majority position on an issue. However, it is not clear that this is a
systematic phenomenon or simply an artifact of the fact Marco Aurelio has dissented on so
many issues that one of his dissents is bound to be adopted by a later court.
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roughly means “obsequious ﬂunky.”25 Marco Aurelio’s quixotic behavior
has earned him many adjectives and nicknames, including the neutral
“countermajoritarian” (contramajoritario), a play on the nonmajoritarian
constitutional role of the STF. Justice Nelson Jobim equated the persis-
tently divergent opinions of Marco Aurelio to “an awful little dentist’s
drill” (chato motorzinho de dentista; Haidar). Another nickname among
his colleagues is perhaps most revealing—ministro voto vencido, or “justice
of the defeated vote”—capturing the predictability with which he dissents
from the majority decisions (Gonc¸alves Couto 2009; see also Kapiszewski
2010: 72, n.46).
To be sure, Marco Aurelio’s dissents may be a product of personality
and preferences as well as the Brazilian legal system. Taylor (2008: 34)
notes that in civil law systems like Brazil, judges are generally understood
to apply the law in rather straightforward, apolitical manner. However,
Brazil has so many laws that it is not unusual to ﬁnd laws cutting in
opposite directions, a phenomenon that allows STF judges wide latitude
in choosing which law to apply. Taylor quotes Marco Aurelio describing
his decision-making strategy: “First I imagine the most just solu-
tion . . . only afterward do I seek support in the law” (Erdelyi 2006;
Taylor 2008: 34, citing Amorim Alves 2006: 22). Marco Aurelio’s dissents,
then, would seem to hinge on what he personally deems “just” and he is
unlikely to be swayed by purely legalistic arguments, leaving ample room
for disagreement. In sum, Marco Aurelio’s solo disagreements with his
colleagues are a regular occurrence, so much so that his style of decision
making has taken on an idiosyncratic quality, justifying excluding him
from the analysis.
Having said this, it is important to note that acknowledging his pattern
of dissents does not necessarily mean that Aurelio’s decisions lack any
political motivation. Kapiszewski highlights injunctions issued by Marco
Aurelio on two crucial cases that suspended political deliberations: (1) the
plebiscite regarding a new form of government (ADI 829, ADI 830), and
(2) congressional deliberations regarding social security reform (MS
22503). In both of these cases, “crucial political processes ground to a
halt as a result of these suspensions” (Kapiszewski 2010: 70–71). Thus,
while we have methodological reasons to remove Marco Aurelio from the
analysis, we remain cognizant that his behavior on the court may not be
apolitical.
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